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A LOOK AT AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
ALBERT I. MooN, JR.t
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid advances being made in modern technology, new
legal problems are arising continuously. An interesting one which
has caused quite a few comments in recent years is the extent of a coun-
try's sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
This particular problem has been brought into focus by two major tech-
nological advances. One of these of course is the launching of man-made
satellites and their dramatic orbiting about the earth.' The second is the
advent of high-speed, long-range jet aircraft into commercial airline
service
These two events emphasize two different aspects of the question of air-
space sovereignty. The orbits of the satellites are such that they cover a
large portion of the earth's surface,' and in so doing they pass directly
over many states of the world at extremely high altitudes, measured in
hundreds of miles.4 Therefore we have the question of what upward limit,
if any, should be placed upon a state's sovereignty. The use of jet liners by
commercial airlines brings out another aspect concerning economics. With
the use of high-speed jets, longer non-stop flights will become more com-
mon, and economic considerations will increase the desirability of great-
circle routes for those flights in all parts of the world However, state
sovereignty at high altitudes would be a definite hindrance to many such
long flights. The legal controls and restrictions now placed upon foreign
aircraft entering the boundaries of some countries would make certain
great-circle routes economically unfeasible.'
In considering these and other aspects of the airspace sovereignty ques-
tion (national security, private property rights, etc.), this article will first
present the historical background leading to the development of present
law in the area. Following this will be a discussion of some of the suggestions
advanced by leading writers on the subject. It will then conclude with a
practical appraisal of the over-all problem, supporting somewhat similar
views expressed by several others.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The historical development of the concept of air sovereignty covers many
years, and is concerned with both private property rights and state terri-
tory. Throughout this development, up to and including the present, there
Member of the California Bar. Presently Assistant Counsel, The Aerospace Corporation, El
Segundo, California. B.S., Carnegie Institute of Technology, and LL.B., U.C.L.A. School of Law.
' See generally, Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1962-63, London (1962); 1962 Space Volume,
Government Data Publications, Wash., D.C. (1962).
'See generally, Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1962-63, London (1962).
'See Jane's and 1962 Space Volume, op. cit. supra note 1.
4 Ibid.
'Air Navigation, Air Force Manual 51-40, pp. 2-2, 2-8. Vol. 1, Wash., D.C. (1959).
6 Sand, Lyon, and Pratt, An Historical Survey of International Air Law Since 1944, 7 McGill
L.J. 125 (1961).
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have been two main schools of thought; those who consider the airspace as
free and not a property interest, e.g., Fauchille and Nys,7 and those who
maintain that property or sovereignty extends upward into the air in-
definitely, e.g., Westlake, Balwin and Collard.! Of course there were many
modifications of both these views, generally representing compromises be-
tween the two extremes.9
A. Private Property Ownership
As far back as the days of the Roman Empire it was considered that the
state had legal rights to the airspace over its territory."- However, this
determination, as was the case generally until fairly modern times, was
concerned only with very low altitudes, affecting such things as trees, man-
made structures, etc." Of course, most of the actual cases concerning air-
space had to do with private property rights rather than the State's rights.
Lord Ellenborough, in an 1815 case, 2 where the defendant had nailed
upon his house a board which projected several inches from the wall and
overhung the plaintiff's garden, stated:
I do not think it is a trespass to interfere with the column of air superin-
cumbent on the close. I once had occasion to rule upon the circuit, that a
man who, from the outside of a field, discharged a gun into it, so as that
the shot must have struck the soil, was guilty of breaking and entering it.
A very learned judge, who went the circuit with me, at first doubted the
decision, but I believe he afterwards approved of it, and that it met with the
general concurrence of those to whom it was mentioned. But I am by no
means prepared to say, that firing across a field in vacuo, no part of the con-
tents touching it, amounts to a clausum fregit. Nay, if this board over-
hanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow that an aeronaut
is liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit at the suit of the
occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in the course of his
voyage. Whether the action may be maintained cannot depend upon the
length of time for which the superincumbent air is invaded. If any damage
arises from the object which overhangs the close, the remedy is by an action
on the case."a
This ruling was followed in other English cases. 4 However, in an 1884
case" the court felt that a telephone wire passing through the airspace
above private property was a trespass, and this general viewpoint has been
upheld in recent cases."
As with the English cases, American courts have also shown a diversity
7 For a more extensive list, see Sand, Freitas, and Pratt, An Historical Survey of International
Air Law Before the Second World War, 7 McGill L.J. 24, 28 (1960).
' See, Lyon, Space Vehicles, Satellites, and the Law, 7 McGill L.J. 271 (1961). For a more
extensive list, see generally Sand, Freitas, and Pratt, supra note 7.
ONijeholt, Air Sovereignty, 11-14, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff (1910).
"Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 Int'l L.Q. 411, 412 (1951);
Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus Est Solum" in International Air Law, Pub. No. 1,
Institute of International Air Law, McGill University (1952).
" Lardone, Airspace Rights in Roman Law, 2 Air L. Rev. 455 (1931). See generally, Cooper,
Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus Est Solum" in International Air Law, op. cit. supra note 10.
"Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219 (Eng. 1815).
3Id. at 220-221.
4 Clifton v. Bury (Viscount), 4 T.L.R. 8 (1887), concerning bullets fired from a musketry
range passing about seventy-five feet above the surface of the land but not striking it.
" Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co., 13 Q.B.D. 904 (1884).
16Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus Est Solum" in International Air Law, op. cit.
supra note 10.
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of opinions concerning private property owners' rights to the airspace
above their property.
In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport" it was stated that the landowner
owns so much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or make
use of, in connection with the enjoyment of the land. This right was said
to vary with the owner's needs and to be coexistensive with them. As
regards trespass, the court held that traversing the airspace above the land
was not, of itself, a trespass at all, but was a lawful act unless done under
circumstances which would cause injury to the owner's possession. How-
ever, in another case,' 8 it was held that flight of airplanes at altitudes as
low as one hundred feet over private land constituted a trespass by reason
of the noise and presence of the aircraft and its occupants.
In the more recent case of United States v. Causby,"' Mr. Justice Douglas
made the following pertinent statement:
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended
to the periphery of the universe--Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.
But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public
highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense
revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace would
clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development
in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
the public has a just claim."0
B. National Sovereignty
From the standpoint of a state's sovereignty over airspace, there has
been an equally wide divergence of opinion. Toward the end of the seven-
teenth century, Pufendorf thought that man's sovereignty in the air was
limited by the ability for effective control.' Most of the controversy about
state sovereignty of airspace began around the start of the twentieth
century. It was at this time that serious consideration was being given to
the use of balloons, dirigibles, and airplanes for both commercial and
military purposes. The leaders of the two main schools of thought were
Fauchille and Westlake. Fauchille introduced the celebrated theory of
"freedom of the air" in 1902." Professor Westlake, at a 1906 meeting of
the Institute of International Law, expressed the thought that the state's
sovereignty had no limit upward. Apparently the main basis for his
opinion was the idea that there was danger of greater damage from falling
objects the higher the altitude from which they fell.
At that time, the states mainly concerned with the problem, because
of their size and geographical location, were the European nations. In
May, 1910, the French Government sponsored a Paris meeting of an In-
ternational Conference on Air Navigation.' The nineteen state conference
" 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1936).
"Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
18328 U.S. 256 (1945).
2"Id. at 260-261.
"1 Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, supra note 10, at 412.
"Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, 4 London, Univ. of London Press (1911); Cooper, The
Right to Fly, 17 Henry Holt and Co., New York (1947).
1aCooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, supra note 10, at 412; Hazeltine,
op. cit supra note 22, at 34.
4Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference in Paris 1910, 19 J. Air L. & Com.
12 (1952); Cooper, The Right to Fly, op. cit. supra note 22, at 18.
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which followed, though technically a diplomatic failure, was of great his-
torical importance. When the conference met, there existed no acceptable
plan for international flight regulation. When the conference adjourned,
it had completed a draft convention of fifty-five articles and three annexes,
including such subjects as aircraft nationality, registration, rules of the
road and photographic and radio equipment in aircraft. The conference
agreed on the following principles which were to re-appear in the Paris
Convention of 1919 and which influenced the Chicago Convention of
1944: the subjacent State may set up prohibited zones above which no
international flight was lawful; cabotage traffic may be reserved for na-
tional aircraft; the establishment of international airlines will depend upon
the assent of interested States. In Professor Cooper's opinion, the confer-
ence first evidenced general international agreement that usable space above
the lands and waters of a State is part of the territory of that State.25 Thus,
the cause of failure of the conference was not, as generally supposed, the
impossibility of reaching agreement as to the legal status of airspace. The
real causes of breakdown were political."
The next important event was the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919
which established the Paris Convention. Article 1 of the Convention stated:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."2 Since
this idea was used almost verbatim in later international agreements, one
of the problems still existing today is what was meant by the term "air-
space" as it was used there. It has been argued convincingly that this "air-
space" refers to the atmosphere with sufficient air to support mechanics de-
pendent on reaction with the air for their aerodynamic lift."
It is also important to determine how much power was given to the
states. Goedhuis analyzed the situation thusly:
The Minutes of the Conference show that the delegates were unanimous in
considering freedom of passage for foreign aircraft as being indispensable for
the international community but-and here we come to the heart of the
matter-from this international community the delegates wanted to exclude
the ex-enemy states. . . .It was not realized that the proclamation of such
an over-strained concept of sovereignty in the first article of the Convention
would of necessity be of consequence, not only for ex-enemies' avaition but
for the whole of international aviation. It was thought that this indispensable
freedom for the 'trustworthy' community of states could be guaranteed by
stipulating in Article 2 of the Convention that each Contracting State under-
takes to accord freedom of innocent passage to the aircraft of the other
Contracting States. By this a conventional basis was therefore given to the
right of passage. On account of the wish to exclude ex-enemy states, the
view was formed that there was no way of acting otherwise. Eventually,
however, this led to the right of passage becoming regarded as no more than
a concession, whereas it is very clear from observations by the authors of the
Convention that this right was considered a "conditio sine qua non" for
international aviation. "
"' Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference in Paris 1910, supra note 24.
" Sands, Freitas, and Pratt, supra note 7, at 30.
27 Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 11 League of Nations Treaty Series
173 (1922); 17 Am. J. Int'l L. (Supp.) 195 (1923).
2 Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, supra note 10, at 413-414.
2: Goedhuis, The Air Sovereignty Concept and United States Influence on Its Future Develop-
ment, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 209, 212 (1955).
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The United States, although a strong advocate of freedom of the air,
assisted in drafting the final convention and later signed but did not ratify
it.3' It then formally asserted this country's sovereignty over its airspace
by means of the Air Commerce Act of 1926"' and the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938,"3 and by signing the Pan American Convention at Havana
in 1928. 3'
In 1929, the United States, along with thirty other nations, took part
in an International Air Conference. ' One year before, the first question
concerning intercontinental aviation arose. The Imperial Airways wanted
to initiate a route over the Belgian Congo. The United Kingdom, in opposi-
tion to Belgium, thought that such service could be put into operation
without special permission, since they believed in the principle of freedom
of passage. However, at the Air Conference of 1929, twenty-seven of the
thirty-one states represented completely abandoned the principle of free-
dom of traffic. 5 Only the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States continued to consider the restriction of air sovereignty
as necessary. As to the motives for the attitude of the great majority of
states:
Considerations of security were put forward, but it was fear of competition
and uncertainty with regard to the state's own ability by which this un-
imaginative attitude was prompted. Not the slightest attention was paid to
the question what consequences the proclamation of the principle of total
unrestrictedness (of sovereignty) would have on the development of world
airlines."
With such feelings among the various nations, modified or possibly
strengthened by World War II, the International Civil Aviation Con-
ference convened at Chicago in 1944. The United States:
insisted on the maintenance of sovereignty of the airspace but, subject to
such sovereignty, desired that air international transport restrictions be kept
at a minimum .... The United States desired that each government should
have transit privileges for its aircraft engaged in scheduled international
service and commercial rights approaching those long customary in the
carriage of commerce at sea, but without the wide and wandering privileges
of a typical tramp steamer."
However, the American delegation failed in its efforts, and Article I of the
Chicago Convention was adopted in words almost identical to those used
in the Paris Convention of 1919: "The contracting States recognize that
every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory."'"
Two companion agreements were annexed to the Convention. The first,
a "five freedoms" plan, embodied most of the liberal restrictions on
"' Cooper, The Rule of Law in Outer Space, 47 A.B.A.J. 23 (1961).
3144 Star. 568, 49 USC § 171 (1958).
2 52 Stat. 973, 49 USC § 681 (1958).
33 International American Conference, 6th, Havana, 1928, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1931. Treaty Series No. 840.
"'Cooper, The Right to Fly, op. cit. supra note 22, at 142.
'" Goedhuis, supra note 29, at 213.
36 Ibid.
"
7Cooper, The Right to Fly, op. cit. supra note 22 at 164.
"' Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944, 147 (Vol. I) Dep't
of State Pub. 2820, U.S. Gov't. Print. Off. (1949).
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sovereignty which the United States wanted.39 This attempt to modify
the Convention proper failed, as only a few states supported it." The
second plan, the so-called "two freedoms," granted airplanes of a Contract-
ing State the right to fly over another Contracting State without stop-
ping and the right to land and take off without a foreign Contracting State
if no cargo or passengers were loaded or unloaded. 1 This agreement was
successful in that it was ratified by thirty states originally, and since
then other nations have endorsed it.4"
Since the Chicago Convention, there have been several attempts to arrive
at other multilateral air transport agreements' which have been unsuc-
cessful." This remains the situation even today. International air service
is bound up in many strict bilateral agreements and restrictions of all sorts
which are imposed on airlines the world over." Such express statements
indicative of international law such as Article 1 of the Chicago Conven-
tion are not accepted by all nations, and even those accepting them cannot
agree on the exact interpretations. In such a situation as confronts the
world, it is fortunate that farsighted legal authorities are now expressing
their dissatisfaction and suggesting possible solutions to the problem.
C. Analogy To Private Property
As was mentioned previously, private ownership of airspace over prop-
erty has been subjugated to the good of the general public. The old
doctrine of private property extending upward indefinitely was fine as
long as it was merely a theoretical concept. At that time the air at higher
altitudes was not being exploited. However, with the advent of man's
flight and modern technology, the air was being used, and it became
expedient to transfer whatever theoretical property rights the individual
formerly had to the state.
A somewhat similar situation seems to have arisen with regard to na-
tional sovereignty. There seems little doubt that each State now has absolute
sovereignty over the air above its territory. Yet, isn't this a merely the-
oretical concept as regards extremely high altitudes? By far the greatest
part of the commercial exploitation of the air is within the relatively low
altitudes of just a few miles from the surface of the earth. Perhaps then,
with the coming of greater use of the air at higher altitudes, it might be
better for the good of the international public to create an international
sovereignty over the airspace at the higher altitudes.
III. SUGGESTED CHANGES AND CLARIFICATIONS
In this section, suggestions advanced by contemporary writers will be
discussed. There has been no attempt to include comments on all the
published writings in this field. Rather, some of the better known and
more provocative ideas are included.
" International Air Transport Agreement.
40 Proceedings, supra note 38, (Vol. II) at 1399.
41 International Air Services Transit Agreement.
42 Proceedings, supra note 38.
" E.g., Geneva Conference of 1947, and the Conference on Coordination of Air Transport in
Europe at Strasbourg in 1954.
'Sand, Lyon, and Pratt, supra note 6.
4' International Agreements and International Air Transportation, Section VII of Aviation
Study presented by Senator John W. Bricker, Chairman, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee S. Doc. No. 163, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (Released Jan. 11, 1955); 22 J. Air L. & Com.
65 (1955).
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One of the leading authorities in international air law is Professor John
C. Cooper. It is interesting to examine the way his ideas about airspace
sovereignty have changed in the last few years. Professor Cooper's original
thoughts on the subject were expressed in a 1951 paper.48 Here, he dis-
cussed the term "airspace" as it was used in the first articles of the Paris
Convention of 1919 and the Chicago Convention of 1944. He presents
a rather logical argument toward the view that this "airspace" was in-
tended to include only that region of the atmosphere in which aircraft
deriving their support from reactions of the air might operate. He goes
on to say that the state of international law is such that now, "The ter-
ritory of the State extends upward at least as far above the surface as to
include a region which can be roughly defined as 'airspace.' And interna-
tional law contains no presently accepted rule as to whether usable space
above and beyond the 'airspace' is or is not part of the territory of
the State below."47 Cooper concludes with his suggestion for a possible
sovereignty limitation: "At any particular time the territory of each State
extends upward into space as far as then scientific progress of any State
in the international community permits such State to control space above
it."4s This plan is of course an extension of Pufendorf's ideas of the seven-
teenth century. However, Cooper is more explicit in recognizing that each
State should have equal sovereignty rights above its territory regardless
of how weak or strong it is in relation to other States.
Cooper later realized that the above solution was impractical, and in
1956 he published a different suggestion:
Long and careful consideration during the past five years has convinced me
of the existence of almost insuperable difficulties in applying the rule which
I then suggested. The only practical way to solve the questions as to the
legal status of areas above those covered by a strict construction of Article
1 of the Chicago Convention will be the adoption of some form of inter-
national agreement. Such a new convention might include these solutions:
(a) Reaffirm Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, giving the subjacent
state full sovereignty in the areas of atmospheric space above it, up to the
height where "aircraft" as now defined, may be operated, such areas to be
designated "territorial space."
(b) Extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to 300 miles above
the earth's surface, designating this second area as "contiguous space," and
provide for a right of transit through this zone for all non-military flight
instrumentalities when ascending or descending.
(c) Accept the principle that all space above "contiguous space" is free for
the passage of all instrumentalities.8
This later suggestion by Cooper is an improvement over his original
idea, but there are still weaknesses and drawbacks to its actual applica-
tion. Of course, the basic idea of some form of international agreement,
such as a new convention, is good, and is probably the only practical way
to put a new international air law into operation. However, there are two
main difficulties involved in the three-region set-up as visualized by
Cooper. One is the determination of the boundary for the first region of
* Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, supra note 10.4 71d. at 414.4 1Id. at 418.
4 Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space, 23 J. Air L. & Com. 308 (1956), reprinted from
the Proceedings of the American Soc'y of Int'l Law, 85-93 (1956).
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"territorial space." The definition as stated is based upon the area in which
"aircraft" may be operated. Even if it were possible to give an acceptable
definition of such "aircraft," it would still be difficult, if not impossible,
to draw an exact line of demarcation. For instance, where would such a
line be drawn for an aircraft such as the United States experimental ve-
hicle, the X- 15. This is a modern experimental ship with aerodynamic
surfaces for flight in the heavier atmosphere, combined with rocket engines
and jet exhausts for flight in upper space." In other words, this manned
aircraft is designed to operate both at low altitudes, such as those used by
commercial airlines, and at extremely high altitudes of several hundred
miles, as a manned satellite of the earth. In between these extremes, there
is a wide region where the X- 15 derives support both from its aerodynamic
surfaces and from the thrust of its rockets. This situation is actually ap-
plicable to all heavier-than-air vehicles, whether they are rocket missiles
or propellor-driven airplanes. Their continued flight at any given altitude
is a function of both the aerodynamic surfaces and the thrust of their
propulsion units. An airplane flying at a low altitude must still have suffi-
cient thrust to stay aloft, as a man-made satellite at an altitude of several
hundred miles must have sufficient velocity to develop a centrifugal force
to counterbalance the earth's gravity. Therefore it is difficult to envisage
any definition which would draw an exact line at the edge of the "air."
The second difficulty concerning Cooper's three-part solution might be
shown by asking, what good does it do? In other words, what practical
benefit can be obtained in marking off these three regions? The only
reason for the establishment of the "contiguous space" is to permit free
passage of "all non-military flight instrumentalities when ascending or
descending." Apparently, Cooper feels that the airspace above the "atmos-
phere" should be free, but for purposes of national security the upper
sovereignty limit is arbitrarily fixed at 300 miles. This has little practical
use, especially in view of the fact that the state of military technoolgy is
such that it is just as easy to operate military missiles or satellites at a
"legal" altitude of say 320 miles as it is at an "illegal" altitude of 280
miles. A further difficulty in definition is encountered in the phrase
"ascending or descending." For example, most man-made satellites such
as are now in existence follow an elliptical orbit. 1 If the orbit of a
particular satellite were to have an apogee of about 1,000 miles altitude
and a perigee of say 150 miles altitude, could it be said to be ascending or
descending when it happened to be below the 300 mile limit? In other
words, the satellite is merely coasting around the earth. The distance the
satellite is from the surface of the earth would be constantly changing,
but it would be in a state of equilibrium (dynamically) with the earth;
while the ordinary definitions of the terms "ascending" and "descending"
imply a state of non-equilibrium. The situation is further complicated when
it is realized that the point of perigee in the orbit of a satellite will be
directly above a different part of the earth's surface nearly every time it
goes around the world. It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that
Professor Cooper's basic idea of the need for a new international con-
vention is good, but the details of his three-area plan of airspace sovereignty
make it impractical.
0 Stambler, X-1 5 Design Details, Aviation Age, July 1958, p. 22.
"Jane's and 1962 Space Volume, op. cit. supra note 1.
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Now, in 1963, Cooper has published another article52 in which he
briefly touches upon this point. This recent article is an excellent dis-
cussion of the need for uniformity in an "Aerospace Law" which would
cover all types of man-made flight vehicles from ordinary balloons and
airplanes to rockets and space ships. As part of the discussion it is explained
that such a body of laws and regulations will necessarily involve the entire
flight regime of such vehicles, all the way from the surface of the earth
to the outer reaches of space navigated by space ships of the future.
Here again, Cooper has apparently altered his previous views, as ex-
pressed in the 1956 paper. He admits that "airspace," as used in most
definitions, is an uncertain boundary.53 He then apparently agrees with and
adopts the definition included in the Draft Code of Rules on the Explora-
tion and Uses of Outer Space,4 prepared by a Study Group of the David
Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, London: " 'airspace'
means the volume of space between the surface of the earth at sea level
and an altitude of 80,000 metres above it."" This somewhat arbitrary
altitude limitation was arrived at by the Study Group after considering
such factors as the altitudes at which the atmosphere has a substantial
"braking" effect on satellites and the altitude at which the air has lost
most of its character of a continuous medium."6
By accepting this new definition of airspace and adding it to Article I
of the Chicago Convention, Cooper has now adopted a more reasonable
and realistic limit to a State's airspace sovereignty. The use of an arbitrary
limit to airspace sovereignty seems to be the only practical solution, since
it appears impossible to set up a reasonable definition of airspace based ex-
clusively on physical characteristics of the atmosphere, as will be more
obvious in the discussion of other writers' suggestions later in this paper.
However, the altitude of 80,000 meters, which is about fifty miles,
seems to be too high for practical commercial reasons. It is extremely un-
likely that any commercial airliners will ever travel at such heights, and
therefore the use of such a high limit to sovereignty would not alleviate
any of the problems encountered in the obstacles to international air
travel which presently hinder the maximum efficient use of the air lanes.
By allowing each country to have absolute control over the use of its
adjacent airspace up to fifty miles, we would continue to have a hodge-
podge of both realistic and unrealistic restrictions and red tape affecting
commercial air travel. Likewise, a similar argument can be used as set
forth previously in relation to Cooper's 3 00-mile limit in that, with respect
to the fifty-mile limit, it would be just as easy to build an aircraft or
rocket, perhaps an advanced design of the X-15, which could operate at
a "legal" altitude of fifty-five miles as one that would ordinarily cruise
at an "illegal" altitude of forty miles. In conclusion, then, this latest idea
as set forth in Cooper's article appears to be a practical and workable limit
to airspace sovereignty, but it entails the serious disadvantage of not
showing any improvement over the existing situation involving the many
impediments to international commercial aviation.
52 Cooper, Aerospace Law-Subject Matter and Terminology, 29 J. Air L. & Corn. 89 (1963).
"id. at 90.
Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 29 J. Air L. & Corn. 141
(1963).
5 Id. at 143.
" id. at 143-144.
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Another authority who has expressed himself on this subject is C. W.
Jenks. Jenks apparently supports the idea of national sovereignty up to an
altitude where the "atmosphere" ends. However, he is mainly concerned
with outer space above the atmosphere. He has a very good argument
showing how illogical the claims of unlimited upward sovereignty are:
any projection of territorial sovereignty into space beyond the atmosphere
would be inconsistent with the basic astronomical facts. The revolution of
the earth on its own axis, its rotation around the sun, and the motions of the
sun and the planets through the galaxy all require that the relationship of
particular sovereignties on the surface of the earth to space beyond the
atmosphere is never constant for the smallest conceivable fraction of time.
Such a projection into space of sovereignties based on particular areas of the
earth's surface would give us a series of adjacent irregularly shaped cones
with a constantly changing content. Celestial bodies would move in and out
of these cones all the time. In these circumstances, the concept of a space
cone of sovereignty is a meaningless and dangerous abstraction .... By reason
of the basic astronomical facts, space beyond the atmosphere of the earth is
and must always be res extra commercium incapable of appropriation by the
projection into such space of any particular sovereignty based on a fraction
of the earth's surface. 7
Concerning jurisdiction over matters in this space outside the atmos-
phere, Jenks goes on to say: "It is most desirable that jurisdiction over
activities in space beyond the atmosphere should be recognized to be vested
in the United Nations and that legislative authority over activities beyond
the atmosphere of the earth should be exercised by the General Assembly
acting through or on the advice of an appropriately constituted body.""
Failing this: "it will be necessary to determine such jurisdiction on the
basis of appropriate criteria inspired by analogies drawn from maritime
and aviation law and to develop common international rules and standards
governing the wide range of problems which would arise.""
Although Jenks presents a very cogent argument against unlimited up-
ward projection of sovereignty, most of the rest of his paper, while very
interesting, has little practical value today. While it is true that it is
never too early to start thinking about a subject such as jurisdiction in
outer space, it is rather difficult to say anything concrete about it until
more facts are known. Jenks also talks about the "atmosphere" as the
region limiting airspace sovereignty. Scientifically, it is impossible to say
where the atmosphere ends. ° The atmosphere of the earth, consisting of
many different gases, merely becomes less and less dense as measured fur-
ther from the earth's surface."' Of course, some sort of limit such as a
certain per centage of density of oxygen or nitrogen might be used as a
limit for the atmosphere, but any system like that would be purely
arbitrary and unrealistic. As was the case with Cooper's plan, the matter
of difficulty involved in any definition of atmosphere makes any solution
based upon an atmospheric limit impractical.
The same criticism can be applied to the suggestions of two other writers,
D. B. Craig and Michael Aaronson. Craig seems to apply the same upper
" Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, 5 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 99, 103-104 (1956).
18Id. at 113.
9 ibid.
"Mitra, The Upper Atmosphere, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta (1952)i Massey and Boyd,
The Upper Atmosphere, Philosophical Library, New York (1959),
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limit, although he begs the issue, by stating: "For present purposes, how-
ever, it seems sufficient to conclude that above the altitudes in which the
Chicago Convention of 1944 is applicable the principle of free space should
reign.""5 Aaronson becomes even more specific, however, in defining the
term "airspace" in the Chicago Convention "as that space enclosed by
the radii of the earth passing through and above surface political boun-
daries, until such radii reach the notional frontier dividing the earth's
atmospheric envelope from the sparse interplanetary gas which is reputed
to permeate interplanetary space.'"" Even he admits that there is no agree-
ment as to the altitude of this notional frontier." Any definition of this
type seems to be ineffective as a practical matter.
Another writer, H. B. Jacobini, goes back to Pufendorf's idea of air-
space sovereignty based upon effective control:
It may be concluded, then, that in regard to the extension of national
sovereignty over territorial space, the upper limits of this jurisdiction will
be determined by the extent upward to which the subjacent state can exert
effective control, and that the drawing of this line at a point short of the
farthest extent of effective control may be tolerated only insofar as such
action does not appear to bear adversely upon the State's feeling of security."
This suggestion of course is practical; in fact, this type of thinking is
very common in those states which exhibit more possessive and isolationist
tendencies.
However, such harsh reasoning is unacceptable under any reasonable
and just standard of international law. As Cooper said:
Can we be said to live in such a world where the physical power at any one
time of any particular State determines its international right to consider
the region above its surface territories as part of its national territory? I
may say here that my own belief is and has always been that if the rule of
effectiveness is to be applied to determine the limit of State territory in
space, then the rule should be that every State, no matter how small or how
weak, as a State of equal sovereignty with every other State, has and should
be admitted to have territorial rights upwards above its surface territories as
high as the rights of every other State no matter how powerful."
Another criticism of Jacobini's plan can be based on even more practical
reasoning. That is the difficulty entailed in the notification of and accept-
ance by other States of each individual State's upward limit of sovereignty.
How is this limit to be established? Can each state arbitrarily express an
altitude to which it can maintain control, thereby necessitating an ac-
ceptance, based on faith, of this limit by other States? Or, would it be
necessary for each State to have an actual scientific or military demonstra-
tion of effective control by means of airplanes, guided missiles, etc.? As-
suming that realistic limits could be established, varying with each state's
capacity for control, a very complicated maze of restrictions would there-
by be placed on international air travel. It is conceivable that a situation
could arise whereby in a short horizontal flight of say 400 miles over the
62 Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. Air L. and Corn. 384 (1957).
6' Aaronson, Altitude of Territorial Sovereignty, 225 L.T. 148 (1958).
"Id. at 148-149.
6' Jacobini, Effective Control as Related to the Extension of Sovereignty in Space, 7 J. Pub. L.
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territories of several States, there could be variations in airspace sovereignty
limits of as much as several hundred miles vertically. This type of situation
would be unbearable and certainly restrictive as far as the development of
international air service is concerned. Therefore, Jacobini's suggestion,
while perhaps expressing the practical attitude of some nations today, is
far from being an optimum or desirable solution to the problem of air-
space sovereignty.
Of all the writers, Mr. Andrew G. Haley has suggested what is prob-
ably the most exact limitation of sovereignty. The fact that he is an
official of the American Rocket Society and of the International Astro-
nautical Federation probably influenced his decision to use a more technical
standard. This standard is the Masson and Gazley flight regime diagram;
a curve plotted on graph paper using one coordinate of velocity and the
other of altitude." The curve, although irregular in shape, generally fol-
lows points of increasing altitude as the value of velocity is increased. The
curving line of this diagram describes the upper limits of flight possible
with vehicles using aerodynamic lift for support. In other words, for any
given velocity, up to about 35,000 feet per second (the velocity necessary
for escape from the earth's gravitational field), there is an upward limit
on the altitude at which an aircraft could derive aerodynamic lift. Haley
explains:
To establish sound bases for demarcation of air and space jurisdiction it is
necessary to consider that the conditions for accomplishing aerial flight,
that is to circle at constant altitude, are weight equals aerodynamic lift plus
centrifugal force. The aerodynamic lift decreases with altitude because of
the decreasing density of the air and in order to maintain continued flight
beyond zero air lift, centrifugal force must take over. Consider the flight of
Captain Ivan C. Kincheloe, in which he took the X-2 rocket plane to 126,000
feet altitude. His flight was strictly an aeronautical adventure and did not
partake in space flight. At the altitude indicated aerodynamic lift carries
ninety-eight per cent of the weight and only two per cent is centrifugal force,
or "Kepler force." It will be noted that in the corridor of continuous flight
when an object reaches approximately 275,000 feet and is traveling at 35,000
feet per second, the Kepler force takes over and aerodynamic lift is gone. This
is a critical jurisdictional boundary."
In other words, Haley supports the idea of national sovereignty over the
airspace above a State's territory up to a certain limit. However, instead of
using the vague limit of the "atmosphere," as other writers have done, he
uses the much more exact limit of the Masson and Gazley diagram. Al-
though this line cannot be criticized scientifically, practical difficulties
would arise in its legal application or enforcement. This is mainly due to
the fact that this flight-regime limit is a function of both altitude and
velocity. By using such a limit, the anomalous situation could arise whereby
an aircraft, flying at a given, constant altitude, could be flying either in
territorial space or in free space, depending only on its speed. The sense of
physical propriety rebels at such an idea. Furthermore, there seems to be
no practical purpose achieved in defining airspace sovereignty according
to the type of aircraft used. It is probable that commercial aircraft in the
foreseeable future will use other means of support besides aerodynamic
6 Haley, Space Law and Metalaw-Jurisdiction Defined, 24 J, Air L, & Com. 286 (1957),
a, Ibid,
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lift, such as rocket thrust." Such a rocket craft, being able to operate out-
side of the aerodynamic-lift flight-regime diagram, would therefore not
be subject to sovereignty limits placed on conventional airplanes. It then
seems reasonable to conclude that Haley's plan to use the Masson and
Gazley diagram is workable for our present-day commercial aircraft, but
is not practical for some present experimental vehicles or for all com-
mercial craft of the near future.
One of the more recent ideas is that put forth by Scafuri, which he
calls the jurisdictional theory. He would exempt from the jurisdiction of
subjacent states all peaceful vehicles in orbital flight, on the basis that
they could not pose a "clear and present fall hazard on the ground." On
the other hand, all other craft whose fall could be reasonably predicted
would remain subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of states beneath its
path. The author explains that: "the jurisdictional dischotomization is
based on an action regime rather than an area regime, i.e., what the vehicle
is doing, rather than where it is.""0
This approach, like some others, runs into the difficulty of technical
definitions. Although it is possible to make an accurate delimitation be-
tween vehicles which are in an orbital flight path and vehicles which are
in a path that will bring them back to the surface of the earth, there will
be problems encountered in the practical application of such a theory. It
would seem that the only valid determination of whether a particular craft
falls into one or the other of these two categories would have to come from
the country of its origin. Not only would its intended flight path be im-
portant, but also someone would have to decide whether its mission was
peaceful. Of course its flight path could eventually be determined by
observation outside of the state from which the vehicle was launched,
but there would be a necessary time lag in so doing. And needless to say,
it would be impossible for another country to determine easily the con-
tents or use of the craft within the peaceful-military spectrum. Another
inherent difficulty with this plan lies in the fact that a powered vehicle
or space craft could change its "falling" flight path to an orbital path, and
vice versa, thereby resulting in a change of jurisdiction at the whim of
those controlling the vehicle.
In this section, some of the ideas and plans suggested as solutions to the
problem of airspace sovereignty by leading authorities have been reviewed
and discussed. It is interesting to note that most of these writers have
agreed that there should be an upward limit to state sovereignty, and they
only disagree basically as to how to establish or define the limit.
IV. A PRACTICAL APPRAISAL
It seems obvious that the situation now existing with regard to airspace
sovereignty and its effect upon international air travel is definitely un-
satisfactory and should be improved in some way. A quotation from the
beginning of the article by Goedhuis seems very appropriate:
In the year 414 B.C., a play was produced in Athens in which Aristophanes
described how the birds when building a free city in the air beat off the
legislators who came to offer their services. If Artistophanes could look at
" Cornog, Economics of Rocket-Propelled Airplanes, Aeronautical Engineering Review, Sept.
1956, p. 30.
" 5eafuri, Space 1,aw; A Plea for the Technolegal Approach, 41 Mich. S.B.J. 42 (1962).
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the present situation in the air and see in what measure the legislators have
prevented the birds of this day from unfolding their wings, he would have
prided himself on his foresight. 1
There are two main factors involved in attempting to appraise such a
problem as entailed in airspace sovereignty. First, there is the question of
what effect an international agreement such as a treaty or convention
would have when applied to all the nations of the world. Second, bearing
this effect in mind, what type of plan would be reasonable and practical?
In considering the effect of an international agreement, it is necessary
to look at international law in general and its function. The eminent jurist,
Max Huber, as Arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case, stated: "inter-
national law, like law in general, has the object of assuring the co-existence
of different interests which are worthy of legal protection."" Aaronson, in
discussing Huber's opinion in this case, commented:
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at suc-
cessive periods should be applied in a particular case (the so-called inter-
temporal law), the arbitrator distinguished between the creation of rights
and the existence of rights. "The same principle which subjects the act
creative of the right of the law in force at the time the right arises demands
that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation,
shall follow the conditions manifested by the evolution of law." He held
that international law is a living organism passing through many evolutionary
stages. 'While recognizing established rules of positive law, it nevertheless
must pay due regard to the tendencies of the era."3
An illustration of this last remark is the situation created by the launch-
ing of American and Russian satellites. The Chicago Convention of 1944
specifically prohibits the unauthorized passage of pilotless aircraft over
the territory of a contracting state. 4 The Convention is definitely a posi-
tive part of international law, at least for the participating states (Russia
is not one of these). Yet there have been no complaints from any other
contracting states concerning the fact that American satellites have been
passing directly over the territories of many of these countries without
authorization and regardless of the fact that there is no accepted definition
of "aircraft" or "airspace" as used in the Convention. It might be said that
tacit authorization was obtained when no objections were forthcoming
after the United States announced the plan to launch satellites two years
in advance of launching. In any case, although it might be said that the
United States "technically" did not follow its international agreement
under the Chicago Convention, no state is going to object vigorously, since
little harm can be done by these scientific satellites. This is just one example
of the application of common sense to the interpretation of accepted in-
ternational law.
Wheaton defined international law as follows: "International law, as
understood among civilized nations, may be defined as consisting of those
rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the
nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such defi-
71 Goedhuis, supra note 29, at 209.
2 The Island of Palmas (Miangas) Arbitration, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, II,
829; 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 867 (1928).
73 Aaronson, Aspects of the Law of Space, 224 L.T. 219 (1957).
74 Proceedings, supra note 38, (Vol. I) at 149.
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nitions and modifications as may be established by general consent."" It
is important to realize that international law is mainly concerned and
most effective with respect to commercial relations between states. Because
it is usually of mutual advantage, most countries are willing to compromise
to a certain extent in arriving at international commercial agreements.
However, when it comes to national security, each state considers this to
be of prime importance, and international commercial agreements will be
violated whenever a nation feels that its security demands such violation.
Examples of this are pointed out in an article by Dr. Pepin."6 Freedom of
the high seas has been an established principle of international maritime
law for many years, and since the Chicago Convention, the same principle
has been established for the airspace over these international waters. Yet,
as Pepin points out, these principles have been violated often in the estab-
lishment of restricted or danger areas concerning national security. "Thus,
in the Pacific, around the atolls of Eniwetok and Bikini there has been
declared an enormous danger area covering fourteen degrees of longitude
and eight degrees of latitude." Off the coast of the United States and of
Canada, there have existed for several years new air defense identification
zones extending at some points for a distance of 200 miles out to sea.""
It seems apparent then that any particular international law will be
accepted and followed by a state only when it is to that state's advantage,
either directly or indirectly, to do so. It is also true, as brought out in the
previous definition, that international law can come into being immediately
by means of an express agreement, such as a treaty, or gradually through
years of acceptance of custom or precedent. Applying these facts to the
problem at hand, it would seem most useful and practical therefore to
establish a reasonable international air law by means of an international
treaty or convention, based on the realization that such law would mainly
be effective for commercial uses rather than for military or scientific
purposes.
Since the problems concerning international aviation are becoming more
involved every day, particularly with the advent of greater technological
advances, the suggestion of establishing new law in this field by means of
some international agreement is certainly practical and most expeditious.
Having reached this conclusion, the next question is what plan should be
the basis of such an agreement?
An obscure, new idea, no matter how meritorious, would have little
chance of success at an international convention, just because it would be
something unfamiliar and therefore suspicious. It would be best then to
suggest a plan which would have some familiarity for all nations. It might
be well to adopt a plan or law analogous to the law of the sea, as sug-
gested by other writers. Such law would have the advantage of familiarity,
and at the same time be a practical solution to the problem.
The historical background of maritime law is analogous to our recent
aviation law history, as has been recognized by several writers;" this is
SWheaton, Elements of International Law, 23 (8th ed. 1866).
"e Pepin, The Legal Status of the Airspace in the Light of Progress in Aviation and Astro-
nautics, 3 McGill L.J. 70 (1956).
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620, 2b, and by the Canadian Information Circular 0/19/51 of 12th May 1951.
" E.g., see Ward, Projecting the Law of the Sea Into the Law of Space, Jag J. 3-8 (March
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especially true from an economic or commercial point of view. In the
early development of the law of the sea, States claimed sovereignty over
entire oceans.8" And sometimes the State with such a claim also had effec-
tive control of the sea area so claimed. 8' However, as Ward commented:
"The broad claims of sovereignty over ocean areas withered away to meet
the needs of the commercial community. We can now see the beginnings
of the same movement with respect to the law of the air and a law of
outer space."" Jenks also commented upon the same idea:
The principle of the freedom of the seas, despite recent encroachments upon
it, has stood the test of centuries of practical application; the principle of
the sovereignty of each State over the air space above its territory, which
principle developed rapidly during the first quarter of the twentieth century
in response to what may prove in retrospect to have been transitional phases
in the development of both air navigation and military security, has already
been considerably qualified by conventional limitations, and may become
increasingly unreal as greater use is made of the upper air space; we cannot
disregard the possiblity that the present law relating to sovereignty over
air space, while well established at the present time, may be regarded by
future generations much as we regard the claims to maritime sovereignty
which were more or less successfully asserted for several hundreds of years
before Grotius and Bynkershoek established the principle of the freedom of
the seas."3
While the idea is well accepted that the principle of freedom of the
seas should be applied to freedom of the air, an important practical prob-
lem comes forth in the determination of an upward altitude limit to na-
tional sovereignty, before reaching this area of free space. Again looking
to maritime law, it is seen that national sovereignty, that is the limit to
territorial water, was generally accepted to be one marine league (three
nautical miles)." Some historians claim that this distance had its origin in
the effective range of the ancient cannon"s (the idea of effective control
for valid sovereignty). Be that as it may, for many years now, various
nations have had weapons with effective ranges greater than three miles.
However, regardless of the ability for effective control at much greater
distances, this three mile limit is still generally accepted as an international
standard of maritime law," despite many disputes and unilateral disagree-
ments with such a limit in recent years. In the same way, with the ad-
vanced military technologies of today, any reasonable altitude limit on
airspace sovereignty will be less than the effective range of military
weapons. Therefore, by looking at the parallel situation in the law of the
sea, it can be seen that any objection (to an altitude limit) based on the
fact that effective military control could be exerted beyond such a limit
would be ill taken. As previously shown, many ideas have been expressed
concerning this upward limit, with the most popular one being the use
"See generally Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (4th rev. ed., 1959); Hall,
International Law, 178 (8th ed., Higgins 1924); Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, 582 (8th
ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
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of the atmosphere as a limit. Considering the objections already stated
about these various plans, it is now suggested by this author that an
arbitrary, rather low, altitude of say five miles be used as the upward
limit to national sovereignty. A low altitude such as this would seem to
be practical, particularly since its use would mainly concern commercial
vehicles.
An altitude limit of around five miles was chosen for two main reasons.
First, this would be an ample height up to which local restrictions and
laws could apply for effective control and protection. In other words,
these applications would cover such things as regulations governing land-
ings on and departures from airports, protection of the rights of private
property owners, such as freedom from excessive noise or vibration, etc.
The second reason is that such a limit would be low enough to allow
flights above it by international airlines using many of today's propellor-
driven commercial aircraft,87 and certainly low enough to allow jet air-
liners to cruise above the limit when passing over any State."
From the standpoint of international commercial aviation, there could
be few objections to such a limit. Any necessary local regulations could
still be effective, yet there would be freedom of flight in the space above
the altitude limit. This is not to say of course that there would be no
international law in the area of free space. Just as with the present situa-
tion concerning flight above international waters, there would be certain
necessary regulations affecting the relationships of all vehicles. In order
to provide safety precautions, such regulations would undoubtedly include
descriptions and limitations of air lanes for travel in certain directions at
certain altitudes. Such air traffic control procedures are now being pro-
vided for air travel over international waters by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Although some nations, such as the
U.S.S.R., are not members of the ICAO, and therefore are not legally
bound by ICAO rules, there have been few, if any, problems encountered
with the air traffic control over international waters involving aircraft of
both members and non-members of ICAO. Whether or not a particular
country is legally bound to observe international air traffic procedures,
most of the regulations will be observed, as a practical matter, in order to
make such flights as safe as possible. In any case, it is hoped that all nations
of the world would be signatories to such an international agreement as
proposed here, since that would be the only rapid and effective way to
bring into being a new international law. Even without the agreement of
all nations, it is likely that a slower process of acceptance would take
place, resulting in an international air law generally accepted by all, as
is the present situation with regard to the law of the high seas.
From the point of view of the scientific community, there also could be
few objections. An altitude limit of about five miles would merely be an
express statement of the situation that has been tacitly accepted anyway.
In other words, there would be no official, legal objection to experimental
vehicles, such as scientific satellites and research rockets, passing over the
territory of a foreign state at a high altitude.
However, from the military standpoint concerning national security,
there is a different problem. It is very doubtful, in the present situation
"
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of the international cold war, that any state would allow the military
aircraft or missiles of a potential enemy to pass over its territory regardless
of the altitude involved. This type of attitude was strongly evident, both
here in America and abroad, after President Eisenhower suggested the
"open skies" inspection plan with regard to disarmament agreements.0
And, of course, it was most obvious in the U-2 incident." It is here that
more common sense must be applied. The attitude of distrust that has
grown up among nations in the cold war will probably be present for
many years to come. Therefore, it seems useless to try to apply any criterion
such as freedom of the air when it concerns military vehicles. No matter
what international agreements are in effect, if a situation arises where a
State fears that it is about to be attacked or its national security violated
in some way, it will take immediate steps for self-protection regardless of
the incidental violation of a prior international treaty. In all of this dis-
cussion, therefore, the legal viewpoint is most important and should not
be confused with military problems.
Thus, the same conclusion can be reached as was stated previously. An
effective, truly international, agreement should be reached concerning a
more reasonable international air law, based on the realization that such
law will be mainly applicable to commercial uses. Even with an express
agreement that all space above five miles is free space analogous to the high
seas, each nation could still prohibit suspicious or threatening military
vehicles from passing over its territory or for that matter, even approach-
ing too near, under an application of the accepted doctrine of self-defense.
It should be emphasized that any such international agreement would
certainly not be accepted unanimously by the nations concerned. Regard-
less of the advantages such a plan might have over the existing situation
or other proposed ideas, there would be a natural reluctance, based on
selfish interests and mutual distrust, which would tend to slow down the
rate of acceptance by the individual states. In any case, such an agreement,
if truly beneficial to all nations, would become more popular with the
passing of time.
The acceptance of such a plan as suggested here, using a low altitude
limit to national sovereignty, while not being a comprehensive solution to
all of international aviation's problems, would certainly be a step in the
right direction. At least some of the red tape regulations now hindering
international commercial aviation could be removed. While the spectacular
growth of commercial aviation in recent years has been marred by the
assertion of too many selfish interests, there has been a growing tendency,
particularly by legal authorities, to support the side of more freedom and
liberalization. It is hoped that this trend will continue. As Goedhuis said:
As the legal conscience tends to further the factors that protect, promote
and enhance life, it is the task of the lawyers to help to create in the minds
of the public a realization of the social element in aviation. It is this element
that Sir Winston Churchill undoubtedly had in mind when he declared Civil
Aviation to be "the greatest instrument for international solidarity.""1
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